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BACKGROUND
The Bank of Canada was facing problems
similar, but not identical, to those facing the Fed
in 1979. Following the adoption of targets for the
monetary aggregate M1 in November 1975, infla-
tion (as measured by the 12-month increase in
the consumer price index [CPI] excluding food
and energy) had decelerated from about 9 percent
in the second half of 1975 to a low of about 51/2
percent in mid-1978. This reflected policies aimed
at a gradual disinflation: monetary policy through
a reduction in M1 growth from 1975 on and wage
and price controls over the 1975-78 period. Subse-
quently, there was a marked intensification of
inflationary pressures in the Canadian economy
from both external factors (the rise in commodity
prices and U.S. inflation) and internal factors (the
pressure of demand in the Canadian economy),
in spite of the continued deceleration of M1.
Inflation increased to about 8 percent by mid-
1979. At the time, a lot of emphasis for the rise
in inflation was placed on special factors, espe-
cially the exit from wage and price controls and
the effects of the renewed rise in oil prices related
to the revolution in Iran in early 1979. In retro-
spect, an important part of the explanation for the
divergence of the path of inflation growth from
that of M1 growth was the high interest rate elas-
ticity of the demand for M1.1 This meant that,
when M1 growth tended to rise above target as a
result of an increase in price inflation, the rise
in interest rates needed to keep M1 on target was
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C
anada is the quintessential “small open
economy.” It has very close ties with the
United States in both trade and capital
movements. On the financial side, interest rate
movements in the United States can affect Canada
fairly quickly through their influence on the
exchange rate and on domestic interest rates. As
a result, economic and financial developments
in the United States have an important influence
on the Canadian economy and on policymaking
in Canada.
The changes in the Federal Reserve operating
procedures of October 6, 1979, and the subse-
quent wide fluctuations in short-term and long-
term U.S. interest rates had significant effects on
interest rate and exchange rate developments in
Canada and thereby on Canadian monetary policy.
This paper examines a variety of issues related
to these developments. The next section of the
paper sets out the background to the Canadian
economic situation in the latter part of the 1970s.
In the following section, I examine the analyses
carried out in the Bank of Canada in response to
the announcement of October 6, focusing partic-
ularly on the analysis of the new operating pro-
cedures announced on that date. The subsequent
section of the paper looks at the effects of the
change in the U.S. policy framework and of the
resulting U.S. interest rate movements on Canadian
financial developments and on the way they
affected policymaking in Canada. A final section
offers some concluding remarks.
1 There may also have been insufficient adjustment for the down-
ward shift in M1 in response to financial innovations when the
targets were rebased.
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 not large enough to slow down demand growth
sufficiently to slow inflation, at least in the short
to medium run.2 Subsequently, financial innova-
tion weakened the link between M1 growth and
output and inflation developments so much that
the Bank of Canada withdrew the M1 target in
November 1982.
ANALYSES CARRIED OUT IN
RESPONSE TO THE OCTOBER 6
ANNOUNCEMENT
At the time of the announcement, I was chief
of the Department of Monetary and Financial
Analysis at the Bank of Canada, which had
responsibility for monitoring and evaluating
U.S. financial developments. In response to the
announcement by the Fed on Saturday October 6
(Board of Governors, 1979), I wrote an initial
memorandum dated October 10 (Freedman, 1979)
to the Governor of the Bank of Canada (with copies
to all senior officials at the Bank). I noted the four
key elements of the package: (i) the discount rate
increase of 1 percentage point, (ii) the marginal
reserve requirement on the increase in managed
liabilities, (iii) the increased emphasis on control-
ling the supply of bank reserves, and (iv) moral
suasion on banks to avoid loans supporting
speculative activity in gold, commodity, and for-
eign exchange markets. Much of the attention in
the memorandum was devoted to the first two
items. However, the two paragraphs on the new
techniques of monetary control are worth quoting
at length.
There is relatively little in the press release
that throws light on the manner in which
reserves control is to be implemented.
Although the Fed re-affirmed its objective
of controlling the growth of M1 and M2…,
it may well be that the main result of
reserve base control will be to control the
growth of bank credit. Indeed, the com-
bination of reserve base control and
increased reserve requirements will act
together to reduce the growth of total
bank assets and liabilities…
On the other hand, if the Fed intends
to use control of the reserve base to achieve
M1 and M2 targets, one can raise the
question of how well base control would
operate when the liabilities subject to
reserve requirements differ from the
aggregate on which the central bank is
targeting. Indeed, given the complexity
of the U.S. system of reserve requirements,
the relationship between M1 and M2 tar-
gets and growth of base is likely to be very
loose. Since the only way in which the
demand for narrow definitions of money
balances can be affected in the short run is
by interest rate changes, one can interpret
base control as a means of getting interest
rate changes in a much more automatic
way and without the political fallout
normally engendered by discretionary
changes in interest rates. Thus, in the near
term, the major result of base control will
probably be to widen substantially the
bands within which the federal funds rate
is permitted to fluctuate. If the Fed wishes
to prevent changes in borrowed reserves
from offsetting its changes in unborrowed
reserves, it will either have to let the dis-
count rate fluctuate more widely (or per-
haps tie it to a market rate) or to impose
administrative controls on the use of bor-
rowed reserves.
Clearly, the initial press release on October 6
gave us relatively little to go on in understanding
the new procedures. It was only with the release
of the staff memorandum (Volcker, 1980) at the
time of Chairman Volcker’s testimony to the
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs on February 4, 1980, that the Bank
of Canada was able to undertake a more in-depth
analysis of the technical elements of the new
procedures. However, I would note that between
1978 and 1980 a number of internal memoranda
on base control, as well as a published technical
report (Clinton and Lynch, 1979), had been written
by members of the staff in response to the aca-
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2 Thiessen (1983). The need for a relatively low interest rate elas-
ticity on money demand is similar to the Taylor principle that
nominal interest rates should rise more than one-to-one with a
rise in inflation.demic literature, the work at the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis and the Swiss National Bank,
and the research being done in England, includ-
ing at the Bank of England (Goodhart, 2005), on
base control and money market multipliers. 
In a subsequent memorandum dated June 16,
1980 (Freedman, 1980), I analyzed the movements
of interest rates, nonborrowed reserves, borrowed
reserves, required reserves, and the various mone-
tary aggregates to see whether in fact the Fed had
been following its announced modus operandi:
If it has been so doing, one might conclude
that the substantially increased volatility
of interest rate movements since last
October is an inherent property of base
control, at least in the form practiced by
the Fed. If, on the other hand, the Fed has
not been following its announced proce-
dures, then one can argue that the recent
movements of interest rates have been at
least in part the result of discretionary Fed
action and not simply the automatic result
of the base control. 
The conclusion of the memorandum was as
follows: 
The above analysis has proceeded on the
assumption that the Fed has controlled
non-borrowed reserves with the objective
of controlling monetary targets. To inter-
pret the movements of non-borrowed
reserves and interest rates in the period
since October 1979 then requires the addi-
tional assumption that the Fed’s horizon
is very short and therefore that sharp
movements in interest rates are a natural
outcome of the technique of control. An
alternative explanation of the events of
the last six months can be offered in terms
of the traditional control of interest rates.
In this form of exegesis the interest rate
increases of February and March were
aimed at breaking inflationary psychology
and the subsequent interest rate declines
were for the purpose of fighting the ensu-
ing recession. With the passage of time one
should be able to distinguish between the
two competing hypotheses. 
Thus, the issue of whether the Fed was using
discretion or simply following a more rigid set of
techniques remained open.
The technical analysis at the Bank of Canada
of the interest rate implications of base control
led to a conference presentation at the end of
October 1980 (Freedman, 1983), also published
as a National Bureau of Economic Research work-
ing paper (Freedman, 1981), entitled “Some
Theoretical Aspects of Base Control.” This paper
examined the implications of base control from
the perspective of a series of increasingly com-
plex models, before presenting a short analysis
of the new Federal Reserve procedures in light
of the theoretical models. The exposition of the
Fed procedures relied heavily on the staff paper
released by the Board in early 1980 and drew on
the discussion in Lang (1980). (As an aside, I
would note that in mid-1980 I presented this
paper to seminars at the St. Louis and the Kansas
City Federal Reserve Banks. The response at the
Kansas City Fed was largely one of agreement
with my analysis of the new techniques, while
an economist at the St. Louis Fed commented
that I sounded as if I were working at the Board
of Governors in Washington, which was not
intended as a compliment.)
Interestingly, there appears to have been no
discussion of the change in technical procedures
at the Fed in official Bank of Canada publications
or in speeches by senior officials. This was in line
with the general principle that a central bank did
not comment publicly on the approach to mone-
tary policy by other central banks. However, there
was considerable discussion of the increase in the
volatility of U.S. interest rates and its implications
for Canada, to which I will now turn. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The substantially higher level and increased
volatility of U.S. interest rates following the
October 6 announcement received a great deal of
attention in Canada and in Bank of Canada discus-
sions. The initial context, as described earlier, was
one of considerable inflationary pressures in
Canada from both external and internal sources.
These developments warranted a rise in interest
rates in Canada as well.
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how to respond to the “extraordinary volatility
of interest rates in the United States.” The Bank
noted in its annual report for 1980 that “move-
ments of this magnitude in U.S. interest rates were
bound to have substantial effects on interest rates
in Canada or on the foreign exchange value of the
Canadian dollar or on both” (Bank of Canada,
1981, p. 9). For reasons that will be discussed
shortly, the Bank chose to run policy in such a
way that some of the impact of U.S. interest rate
movements in 1980 fell on Canadian interest rates
and some on the exchange rate. Thus, the “swings
in Canadian short-term interest rates, while con-
siderable, were much smaller than in the United
States and the value of the Canadian dollar in U.S.
funds almost always moved inversely with U.S.
interest rates” (p. 9).
As a result of the increased volatility in
interest rates, the Bank of Canada announced on
March 10, 1980, that the Bank Rate, the minimum
interest rate that the Bank charges on its advances
to the chartered banks, would in the future be set
at 1/4 percentage point above the average rate estab-
lished in the weekly tender for 91-day Treasury
bills issued by the Government of Canada (Bank
of Canada, 1980). The change to a floating Bank
Rate was made to give the Bank of Canada addi-
tional flexibility in the disturbed state of external
financial markets.3 The floating Bank Rate proved
to be a useful mechanism in the more volatile
environment for interest rates and remained in
place until February 1996.
There were two major issues that confronted
a country like Canada (and other open economies
as well) in the face of the sharply increased volatil-
ity of U.S. interest rates in the 1979-81 period.4
First, what are the policy implications for a coun-
try wishing to achieve its announced target for
monetary aggregate growth? Second, and relatedly,
what is the role of the exchange rate in the setting
of policy?
In analyzing the possible responses of a small
open economy with a monetary aggregate target
to U.S. interest rate movements, there were three
cases to be considered: (i) the nominal interest
rate increase in the United States reflected an
increase in real interest rates; (ii) the nominal
interest rate increase reflected an increase in
inflationary expectations; and (iii) the rise in the
nominal interest rate reflected a rise in inflationary
expectations, but the exchange market interpreted
it as a rise in the real rate.5,6
The first case, that the nominal interest rate
movements reflected real interest rate movements,
was the most relevant in the 1979-81 period. The
small open economy could react to a rise in real
interest rates in the United States by one of two
polar responses or by an intermediate response.
One polar response would be to leave its policy
interest rate unchanged. This would result in a
depreciation of its currency, upward pressure on
demand and inflation, and an increase in M1 rel-
ative to its target. The other polar response would
be to raise the domestic interest rate by the same
amount as the interest rate increase in the United
States. This would result in an unchanged foreign
exchange rate (at least initially), but the increase
in domestic interest rates would lead to a reduc-
tion in M1, lower aggregate demand, and down-
ward pressure on inflation. 
One intermediate response would be to move
the domestic interest rate in the same direction
as the interest rate in the United States, but by a
lesser amount, in order to keep M1 unchanged in
the medium run. The higher interest rate would
5 While the analysis in this paper is done in the context of an
increase in U.S. interest rates, it also holds with signs reversed for
a decline in U.S. interest rates
6 The analysis is partial in the sense that it does not take account of
the spillover effects into the small open economy of movements
in U.S. aggregate demand. It also focuses on movements in U.S.
interest rates that are perceived to be transitory. For U.S. interest
rate increases that are perceived to be long-lasting, domestic interest
rates in a small open economy would over time have to match those
in the United States, with adjustments to shocks occurring in the
long run via exchange rate movements.
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3 The Bank emphasized in its press release that its influence “on
the level and movement of short-term interest rates in Canada will
not be greatly different with a floating Bank Rate than it has been
with a fixed Bank Rate...A floating Bank Rate does not mean a
‘hands off’ policy by the Bank” (Bank of Canada, 1980).
4 This section of the paper relies heavily on my presentation at the
Kansas City Fed conference of August 1982 (Freedman, 1982). As
noted in that article, my analysis of the possible responses to U.S.
interest rate movements in a small open economy with a monetary
aggregate target drew heavily on earlier work by Pierre Duguay,
then Assistant Chief in the Department of Monetary Analysis and
now Deputy Governor at the Bank of Canada. 
 lead directly to an appreciable reduction in the
demand for M1 and would also put downward
pressure on aggregate demand. The change in the
spread between Canadian and U.S. interest rates
would lead to a depreciation in the Canadian
dollar (but less than in the first polar case), which
would put upward pressure on aggregate demand
and on Canadian prices. Over the medium run,
the downward pressure on M1 from the direct
effect of the interest rate increase would be offset
by the upward pressure on M1 from higher aggre-
gate demand and the rise in Canadian prices
resulting from the depreciation. That is, the out-
come of the rise in the interest rate and the fall in
the value of the Canadian dollar would be some-
what higher aggregate demand, composed of an
improved trade balance and weaker domestic
demand. In the short run, the combined interest
rate increase and depreciation would likely result
in a temporary decline in M1 because the interest
rate increase would probably affect M1 demand
more rapidly than would the upward movements
in aggregate demand and prices. 
If the interest rate increase in the United States
were a reflection of increased inflationary expec-
tations in that country and if it were so interpreted
by financial markets, there would be no need for
the small open economy to adjust its interest rates,
unless it too were facing inflationary pressures.
With unchanged real interest rates in the two coun-
tries, there should be no change in the exchange
rate. Hence, the interest rate movements in the
large country should have no effect on demand
or inflation in the small open economy.
In the 1979-81 period, the very volatile move-
ments in U.S. interest rates were interpreted
largely as real interest rate movements, although
some component of them may have reflected
changes in inflation expectations. Initially, demand
and inflationary developments in Canada called
for a tightening of policy, but to a lesser extent
than in the United States. Hence, Canadian mone-
tary policy aimed at adjusting interest rates in the
same direction, but not to the same extent, as U.S.
interest rate movements. The Bank of Canada
explained, as follows, its policy of adjusting
interest rates to a greater extent than indicated
by the short-run movements of M1:
The Bank of Canada has preferred to
react immediately to moderate potential
exchange-rate movements rather than to
wait until an increase in inflation, induced
by the exchange rate, has pushed up M1.
While these actions by the Bank of Canada
have on occasion caused M1 to move
below the target range or to remain there
longer than would otherwise be the case,
these temporary divergences from target
have typically been brief. (Thiessen, 1983) 
Thus, policy actions taken in the face of U.S.
interest rate movements were seen as a form of
“short-circuiting.” That is, the Bank adjusted
interest rates not only in response to current devel-
opments in M1 but also to avoid future movements
in M1 that would result from insufficient adjust-
ment of interest rates and the associated movement
of the Canadian dollar.
The policy of letting some of the pressure from
U.S. interest rate movements fall on domestic
interest rates and some on the exchange rate
worked reasonably well in 1980. However, strong
inflation pressures in Canada in 1981 along with
weakness in the exchange rate for the Canadian
dollar resulted in Canadian interest rates moving
up more than U.S. interest rates during the year. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The developments in the 1979-81 period led to
an increased emphasis on the role of the exchange
rate in the conduct of policy. Initially, as described
above, the increased focus on the exchange rate
was done in the context of a strategy that targeted
M1. Subsequently, after the withdrawal of the
monetary aggregate target in November 1982,
considerable attention was placed on the direct
effects of exchange rate movements on inflation
and their indirect effects on aggregate demand.7
7 Crow (2002, p. 154) puts it as follows: “Hanging on to the exchange
rate as best we could was not the real objective but rather, with the
crumbling of M1 targets, another way of guiding monetary policy
in an anti-inflationary direction. In other words, shadowing the
US dollar was a means to an end. The end was a better inflation
performance, using the instrument and the rationale that was
immediately available—the exchange rate—as a means for nudging
Canada along that path.”
Freedman
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ment of the Monetary Conditions Index (MCI),
which integrated into a single measure the effects
of the two channels through which monetary pol-
icy operates in a small open economy—interest rate
changes and exchange rate changes (Freedman,
1995). The Bank of Canada was well aware of the
importance of interpreting the source of any
exchange rate movement in deciding on the appro-
priate policy response. However, the financial
markets tended to treat all exchange rate move-
ments as resulting from “portfolio shocks” of the
sort that were prevalent in the 1979-81 period, and
indeed for quite some period thereafter, rather
than effects of “real shocks” (such as changes in
the relative prices of commodities produced in
Canada). This led them to expect an offsetting
interest rate movement for all exchange rate
movements. Eventually, in 1998, because of the
difficulties of communicating to the markets the
importance for the policy process of the source
of the exchange rate movement, the Bank aban-
doned the MCI measure as an input into monetary
policy actions. Nonetheless, as was the case in
the 1979-81 period, it still remains important to
interpret the source of any exchange rate shock
in deciding how to respond to it. 
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